GALEN AND THE PHILOSOPHERS:
PHILOSOPHICAL ENGAGEMENT, SHADOWY CONTEMPORARIES, ARISTOTELIAN TRANSFORMATIONS

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1. Galen's attitude and self-definition in relation to philosophy

It is more usual to emphasize the senses in which Galen is a philosopher than those in which he is not. There are a number of reasons for this. One is that recent scholarship has tended to focus more on those areas of his work which could be described as philosophical than on others. Galen's contributions to logic, to epistemology and scientific methodology and to moral psychology, as well as his position in relation to teleological explanation and to causation in the natural world, have provided material of particular interest to Galenic scholars. The fact that some, if not most, of the detailed studies of Galen's thought in the last thirty years or so have been done by practitioners of 'ancient philosophy' – and indeed by some of its foremost practitioners – is not irrelevant here.[1] By contrast, Galen's works of diagnostics and therapeutics, and even of physiology outside the philosophical context, remain comparatively neglected.[2] In the context of such philosophically-based studies, moreover, it is usual to trace Galen's relationship with philosophical schools of thought; to discuss, for example, the extent to which he is a Platonist, or even a Middle Platonist, the influence of Aristotle, the nature of the interaction of Stoicism with his fundamentally Platonist psychology.

Before going any further I should clarify that I do not seek to diminish the validity or interest of such studies (to which, indeed, I have myself contributed). I merely here point out that such discussions of Galen's philosophical views and philosophical affiliations (*e.g.* his theory of the soul; the extent to which he is a Platonist) tend, at least implicitly, to reassert the notion that he is a philosopher of at least *some* kind – in a way which I shall suggest is somewhat misleading.

[1] One thinks here, of course, of the work of Barnes, Donini, Frede, Gill, Hankinson, Lloyd, Moraux, Vegetti – to name only a handful of the most illustrious contributors from this discipline.

[2] There are of course exceptions, such as A. Debru, *Le corps respirant: la pensée physiologique chez Galien* (Leiden 1996) in the field of physiology. Anatomical texts, meanwhile, constitute something of a special case, having provided a particular focus, or intersection, of the interests of traditional classical scholarship and traditional medical history in the early to mid-twentieth century – interests which have perhaps never entirely faded (especially in view of their connections with other aspects of Galen's thought), and in any case have been reasserted in particular by J. Rocca, *Galen on the brain: anatomical knowledge and physical speculation in the second century AD* (Leiden 2003).

Another reason for the emphasis on Galen's philosophic nature in modern scholarship is Galen's own emphasis on it. There are clearly senses in which Galen wishes to appear as philosophical, if not as an actual philosopher. The short treatise *The best doctor is also a philosopher*, taken on its own, would certainly make us imagine that Galen wished us to regard him as a philosopher; and the similarly rhetorical *Exhortation* places medicine alongside philosophy in the hierarchy of arts in a way which tends to make us think that the status of the former is being elevated by association with the latter. Then there is the phrase which Galen reports the emperor Marcus Aurelius as using 'continually' about him, that he was 'first among doctors, but the only one [*or*, unique: *monon*] amongst the philosophers'.[3] Again, the inference might easily be drawn that the status of philosopher is yet more important to Galen than the status of doctor.

More broadly, furthermore, there is an engagement with philosophical texts and authorities, and an adoption of philosophical language, which run through a very large part of his oeuvre. The former – engagement with philosophical texts and authorities – is central, of course, in discussions of logic, of causal questions, of moral psychology and ethics; but also in discussions of the soul in physiological and indeed embryological contexts; in discussions of the design and anatomy of the body; and in discussions of physics and element theory. Thus, a large part of what we would call biological science, in Galen, is directly informed by discussions that derive from the philosophical tradition. Furthermore, the latter – adoption of philosophical language – to a considerable extent pervades even texts which do not so obviously belong within this philosophical tradition. *Thrasybulus*, for example, which overtly belongs within a medical tradition of the definition and subdivision of the art of healing, seems to rely heavily on Aristotelian notions. There must, for example, be a single *telos* for each art, that *telos* being the same as the good for the thing in question;[4] and, more broadly, the text is informed by an emphasis on philosophical modes of argumentation – the priority of definition and disambiguation, the importance of making divisions in a logically appropriate way – not to mention references to specific philosophical texts, especially of Plato. And such phenomena could doubtless be exemplified in different ways from a wide range of essentially *medical* texts in Galen's output. To touch on a small number of the huge possible range of examples: one might consider the broadly Aristotelian usage, even in medical contexts, of such terms as *ousia* or *sumbebêkos*; or the use of the term *adiathrôtos* (taken from the philosophical tradition) in his criticism of the inadequacy of his medical rivals' distinctions;[5] or indeed the huge importance to Galen in a whole range of areas (*e.g.* in the pulse, in fevers, in nosology) of the activity of subdivision according to a logical procedure – an activity which itself seems fundamentally indebted to the philosophical tradition and to Plato and Aristotle in particular.

It is not merely the case, then, that Galen is imbued with a philosophical culture which informs his work on a number of levels. It is also the case that there are at least senses in which he wishes to adopt the mantle of the philosopher.

[3] *Praen.* 11, XIV.660 K = 128.27-28 Nutton.

[4] *Thras.* 13, V.827 K = 48.13-16 Helmreich; 30, V.860 K = 71.24-72.8 Helmreich.

[5] On this terminology *cf.* P. J. van der Eijk, *Medicine and philosophy in classical antiquity: doctors and philosophers on nature, soul, health and disease* (Cambridge 2005) Ch. 10 and esp. 280-81 n.7.

Indeed, Galen's involvement with philosophical culture is so deep that we are inclined to overlook the equally strong sense in which Galen rejects the profession of philosophy, and sees himself as standing outside it.

Let us first return to those quotations on philosophy which we have already cited, and first of all to the text *The best doctor is also a philosopher*. As so often with Galen, context is all-important. The context in this case is that of a highly rhetorical argument – in fact, a protreptic or exhortatory speech aimed at the advancement of certain kinds of study and attitude. It is indeed true that, at the climax of this rhetorical argument, Galen states that a doctor should be a philosopher. Or, to be more precise, it is true that he pours scorn, via a rhetorical question, on the negation of that proposition:

> So are you going to quibble over terms, and utter some nonsense for the sake of arguing, for example that a doctor should be restrained, self-controlled, above monetary matters and just, but not actually a philosopher; or that he should understand the nature of bodies and the activities of organs and the function of parts and the distinctions in diseases and the indications as to treatment, but not actually have been trained in logical theory?[6]

This passage, in fact, provides a good summing-up of what Galen *does* regard as essential in philosophy, throughout this short treatise. There are two key features: the right ethical disposition, and an understanding of nature (such understanding itself being based on correct logical training). This pairing, indeed, is of considerable importance throughout Galen's work. The two go together: as Galen frequently reasserts in various contexts, you need moral fibre in order to reach the relevant level of intellectual attainment without giving up or being distracted or corrupted; and, of course, you need that level of intellectual attainment for the understanding and practice of medicine. It is interesting in this context to note that the treatise begins with – and for a considerable length of time stays with – Hippocrates. It is Hippocrates who is the model in both the relevant senses: he was an ethical paragon, and he understood nature. The particular senses in which the doctor should be a philosopher, then, in the striking rhetoric of this treatise, are the senses in which Hippocrates (rather than any actual philosopher, past or present) was one. Hippocrates, in this text, appears as the philosopher *par excellence*.

Galen is, then, appropriating to himself the discipline of philosophy; but he is certainly not doing so in any straightforward or conventional sense. It is not irrelevant here also to point out that in Galen's great reconciliation of the views of Hippocrates and Plato, it is Hippocrates who is regarded as the senior figure – in the fields of element theory, physiology and even, in certain senses, the description of the soul.[7] Nor, indeed, is

[6] *Opt.Med.* 4, I.61-62 K = 291.22-292.5 Boudon-Millot. Translations are my own unless otherwise stated.

[7] In *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, Galen emphasizes the chronological priority of Hippocrates, the indebtedness to him of Plato (and of other philosophers), and in some cases the superiority of Hippocrates' exposition to Plato's. 'Plato followed Hippocrates in element theory': *PHP* 8.2, V.665 K = 492.31-33 De Lacy; 8.4, V.675 K = 502.10-11 De Lacy; and *cf. PHP* 8.5, V.681-82 K = 506.25-33 De Lacy and 8.9, V.713 K = 532.28 De Lacy. 'Plato, Aristotle and their followers emulated Hippocrates' discussion of humours': *PHP* 8.5, V.684-85 K = 510.1-3 De Lacy.

it irrelevant that this pairing – ethical distinction and attainment in logic (with a relevance of mathematically-based studies) – is precisely that which he attributes to his own father, and which he regards as having been so important in his own formation. That point is made clearly (both with regard to his father and his own education) in *The affections and errors of the soul*;[8] and, it is also summarized neatly in *Good and bad humours*. The latter passage runs as follows:

> I had a father who was extremely skilled in geometry, architecture (*architektonikê*), arithmetic, mathematics and astronomy, and admired by all who knew him for justice, goodness and self-control – *like none of the philosophers*.
>
> *Bon.Mal.Suc.* 1, VI.755 K = 392.21-24 Helmreich

The phrase which I have italicized is surely quite significant here. The desired ethical and intellectual qualities are, in fact, things that set one *apart* from 'the philosophers'.

Let us turn to the second example mentioned above, the hierarchy of the *technai* in the *Exhortation*, and look at the passage in question in more detail. The context, let us remind ourselves, is a contrast between the followers of Fortune (*tuchê*) and those of Hermes, who is the representative of the arts or specialized skills (*technai*) – a contrast which takes its starting-point from a traditional pictorial or sculptural representation of this theme. In the following passage we are 'looking' at the latter set, which is subdivided into three bands (*choroi*).

> The other band consists entirely of fine men, practitioners of specialized skills … In their midst is the god … Those nearest the god, ranged in a circle about him, are geometers, mathematicians, philosophers, doctors, astronomers, and scholars. Next, the second band: painters, sculptors, grammarians, carpenters, architects [*or* engineers] and stone-workers; and after them the third order: all the other specialized skills. *Protr.* 5, I.6-7 K = 88.19-89.5 Boudon

We should again not forget the literary context. At one level, Galen is doing no more than describe a tradition of visual representation – how precisely, may be a matter of debate.[9] Furthermore, the *overall* rhetorical force of the treatise should be borne in mind: the exaltation of specialized skills in general, and the importance of education, rather than the

'Hippocrates placed the source of the spirited capacity in the heart before Plato did': *PHP* 6.8, V.575 K = 416.34-35 De Lacy. Senses in which Plato would have done better to follow Hippocrates more closely are discussed at *PHP* 8.6, V.696-99 K = 518.26-520.35 De Lacy; 8.8-9, V.710-13 K = 530.12-532.27 De Lacy. Here, too, then, we have a certain sense in which the traditional status of philosophy is downgraded at the expense of medicine.

[8] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 1.8, V.40-42 K = 27.22-28.21 de Boer. It is hardly coincidental that it is the discipline of *architektonia* which provides the prime example of the truth-giving logical procedure in Chapter 5 of *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2, V.80-82 K = 54.20-55.27 de Boer; or that it is, specifically, an architect who cuts through the intellectual flannelling of the philosophers in Chapter 7 of the same work: *ibid.* V.98-101 K = 65.16-67.1 de Boer.

[9] Attention has been drawn to points of contact between Galen's description and that of the *Tabula* of Cebes, on which *cf.* esp. M. Trapp, 'On the *Tablet* of Cebes', in *Aristotle and after*, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 68, ed. R. Sorabji (London 1997) 159-78.

making of precise distinctions between skills.[10] Still, his particular presentation of the material surely gives scope for the reflection of his own views. And here the perception mentioned earlier has some validity: in a social context where philosophy had – at least traditionally, and at least in some people's eyes – a higher, more educated, status than medicine, the rhetorical force of the inclusion of medicine in the same band as philosophy is to elevate the former. It is noteworthy, though, that philosophy here certainly does not have the *highest* status: both it and medicine are at the same level as four other skills; and it may indeed be of some significance that geometry and mathematics are mentioned first among these. What are being elevated to prime position here are in fact the precise sciences, those which involve *logikê*; and, of course, the inclusion of medicine amongst these is of great significance for Galen's view of the status of medicine and of his own intellectual activity. Crucially, medicine belongs here with the intellectual or contemplative specialisms and not with those in the second band – surprisingly, in this case, even architecture! – which might be summarized as practical or productive. Galen indeed makes explicit the principle of this 'binary distinction' (*dittês ... diaphoras*) in the *technai*, later in the treatise: 'some are logical and noble, others are inferior (*eukataphronêtoi*), involving bodily labour – and the latter we call artisanal (*banausous*) and manual'.[11]

Again, then, we seem to have – at least by implication – a view of philosophy which accords with that seen in *The best doctor is also a philosopher*: what matters about philosophy is its logical rigour, the relations it has with the geometrical, mathematical and astronomical sciences and with the truth-giving claims of those disciplines. The philosophers Galen sees in this first band, we are tempted to think, are really logicians, or perhaps by extension *phusikoi*.

It is also interesting, incidentally, to consider the sixth category which Galen includes in this first band: scholars (*grammatikoi*). We do not have space to explore this point in any detail here; but this positive assessment of scholarly activity – and the possible implication that this is a *technê* to which he would like to lay claim personally – are interesting in a way which I think has not been appreciated.[12] With the term *grammatikoi*

[10] There is a question whether the full title of the work was 'Exhortation to [the study of] the arts' (the traditional form in which it is cited) or rather 'Exhortation to [the study of] medicine'; the matter is discussed in detail by V. Boudon (*Galien, Œuvres, Tome I. Exhortation à l'étude de la médecine. Art médical*, ed. and trans. V. Boudon (Paris 2000) 35-38), who argues for the latter. If this is correct, however, it seems that the text we have must then correspond to the first, more general, part of that original text (encouraging the study of the arts), rather than the part (now missing) which focussed specifically on medicine.

[11] *Protr.* 14, I.38 K = 117.2-6 Boudon; *cf.* also Boudon's discussion of this classification in *Galien, Œuvres, Tome I. Exhortation* (n.10, above) 32-35.

[12] A similar list of exalted 'rational' or 'logical' arts, including that of the *grammatikos*, appears at *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.7, V.103 K = 68.14-15 de Boer. I do not mean to imply that Galen's scholarly activity has itself been neglected by modern scholarship – far from it – but only that his attitude to the *technê* of the *grammatikos*, and the extent to which he may lay claim to that, has not been directly addressed. For example, A. E. Hanson, 'Galen: author and critic', in *Editing texts – Texte edieren*, ed. G. W. Most (Göttingen 1998) 22-53, rightly draws attention to Galen's concern for scholarly skills and even specialization (which, however, she associates with the concept of the

Galen refers to the scholarly specialism which involves the ability to understand, establish the correct text of, and comment on 'classical' texts from the past. An enormous amount of Galen's intellectual activity, especially but not only through commentaries, was, in fact, scholarly in this sense.

The third example cited above – Marcus Aurelius's alleged statement that Galen is first amongst doctors and 'the only one' amongst philosophers – should be seen in its context, too. It comes pretty much at the climax of Galen's self-publicizing account, in *Prognosis*, of his successes, both in actual cures and in gaining respect, amongst the highest echelons of the social and intellectual elite of Rome. The remark Galen reports would, if actually uttered, have been a casual, semi-humorous aside on the part of a cultured emperor – a gently ironic phrase of flattery addressed to one who had found favour with him. Indeed, it seems to me not implausible that the emperor might have spoken to Galen in such a spirit. By the same token, of course, such a remark cannot be taken too literally as identifying a label to which Galen wishes to lay claim.

But even here, two more specific aspects of the context merit attention. One is the explanation that Galen gives in the words immediately following the attributed remark. As if by way of gloss on the emperor's rather striking phrase, Galen continues: 'for he had already had experience of many who were not just greedy, but also quarrelsome, conceited, envious and spiteful'.[13] Again, the ethical aspect (alongside the logical rigour that Galen exemplifies elsewhere in the work) is central to Galen's positive account of what it is to be a 'philosopher' – and, of course, what in fact marks him out from his contemporaries. The second aspect of the context that seems to me worth considering here

philologos), but misses the specific importance of the *grammatikos* or of *grammatikê*. Galen's scholarly activity on Hippocrates, in particular (evidenced by a vast body of extant commentaries), has been very widely explored. The extent of his scholarly activity, ranging far beyond that, can be clearly appreciated by even a glance at the last five chapters (and especially the last) of *My own books*; and, now, by the range of his own library, and his own scholarly activity with manuscripts, described in *Avoiding distress*; see esp. *Ind.* 3-30, 3-11 Boudon-Millot, Jouanna, Pietrobelli; and *cf.* n.14 below specifically on his Aristotelian activities. For discussions of Galen's scholarly activity, see *e.g.* P. Manuli, 'Lo stile del commento: Galeno e la tradizione ippocratica', in *La scienza ellenistica: atti delle tre giornate di studio tenutesi a Pavia dal 14 al 16 aprile 1982*, eds G. Giannantoni and M. Vegetti (Naples 1984) 375-94; D. Manetti and A. Roselli, 'Galeno commentatore di Ippocrate', in *ANRW* 2.37.2, ed. W. Haase (Berlin and New York 1994) 1529-1635, 2071-80; D. Manetti, 'Galeno, la lingua di Ippocrate e il tempo', in *Galien et la philosophie*, Entretiens sur l'Antiquité classique de la Fondation Hardt 49, eds J. Barnes, J. Jouanna, and V. Barras (Vandoeuvres, Geneva 2003) 171-228; *id.*, 'Galen and Hippocratic medicine: language and practice', in *Galen and the world of knowledge*, eds C. Gill, T. Whitmarsh, and J. Wilkins (Cambridge 2009) 157-89; H. Von Staden, 'Science as text, science as history: Galen on metaphor', in *Ancient medicine in its socio-cultural context*, eds P. J. van der Eijk, H. F. J. Horstmanshoff, and P. H. Schrijvers, 2 vols (Amsterdam 1995) II 499-518; *id.*, 'Galen and the Second Sophistic', in *Aristotle and after* (n.9, above) 33-54; *id.*, 'Gattung und Gedächtnis: Galen über Wahrheit und Lehrdichtung', in *Gattungen wissenschaftlicher Literatur in der Antike*, eds W. Kullmann, J. Althoff, and M. Asper (Tübingen 1998) 65-94; V. Nutton, 'Galen's library' in *Galen and the world of knowledge* (this note, above) 19-34.

[13] *Praen.* 11, XIV.660 K = 128.28-30 Nutton.

is the extent to which Galen is in this text presenting himself as interacting with a number of people who *do* define themselves as philosophers, or who have strong philosophical interests, and as (at least) able to hold his own in this milieu. The preponderance of Aristotelians among those whom Galen here introduces to us, either as fairly close associates or as interlocutors, is remarkable. It is tempting to say that there almost seems to be a kind of high-society, Aristotelian clique into which Galen, at this period of his life, gains an *entrée*. Of course, Galen's most important successes in *Prognosis* are medical in character. But he is also exercised to show how he belongs, and indeed excels, intellectually and socially, in this world which seems to consist largely of philosophers and powerful men with strong philosophical interests. One of the most remarkable features of this text, in fact, is the synergy, or interrelated nature, of those two elites – the intellectual (and more specifically Aristotelian) and the social.[14] There is, furthermore,

[14] Central to the narrative of the text are a number of individuals who are either Aristotelian philosophers or extremely well-positioned members of Roman society with strong Aristotelian interests. 'Eudemus the Peripatetic philosopher', an acquaintance from Pergamum (and apparently a teacher of Galen, *Praen.* 3, XIV.613 K = 82.12 Nutton) is impressed by the logical, indeed syllogistical, nature of Galen's account of his discovery of the future course of his illness: διαλεκτικῶς … συνελογίσω τὴν εὕρεσιν τοῦ γενησομένου, *Praen.* 3, XIV.618 K = 86.29-30 Nutton. (But the Eudemus to whose *Peri lexeôs* Galen devoted three books of commentary was doubtless rather Eudemus of Rhodes, the pupil of Aristotle; *cf. Lib.Prop.* 17 [ex-14], XIX.47 K = 171.15-16 Boudon-Millot, and see further below in this note). Through Eudemus, Galen meets Sergius Paulus, who is about to be *praefectus urbi*, and Flavius Boethus, 'already an ex-consul and himself a student of the philosophy of Aristotle – as indeed was Paulus': *Praen.* 2, XIV.612 K = 80.16-19 Nutton. There arrive two more individuals who combine consular rank and intellectual activity: Barbarus and Severus – the latter again 'an enthusiast for the philosophy of Aristotle': *Praen.* 2, XIV.613 K = 82.6-7 Nutton. On the identities and history of all these figures, *cf.* Nutton's notes *ad loc.*; also now H. Schlange-Schöningen, *Die römische Gesellschaft bei Galen: Biographie und Sozialgeschichte* (Berlin and New York 2003), who gives a very full account (esp. 137-72) of Galen's rise to prominence in Roman society, and of the role of these individuals within that. Boethus proceeds to set up a public demonstration involving other (Platonist and Aristotelian) philosophers, and in particular his own teacher, Alexander of Damascus; this demonstration then attracts the attention of 'all the intellectuals (φιλολόγοις, *Praen.* 5, XIV.629 K = 98.12 Nutton) living in Rome': *Praen.* 5, XIV.627-30 K = 96.5-100.6 Nutton. Impressed by Galen's demonstrations, and also by the cure of Boethus's wife, Boethus becomes an important patron of Galen and, 'like Severus, was himself willing to tell the emperor Marcus Aurelius, then at Rome, all about me': *Praen.* 8, XIV.647 K = 116.20-22 Nutton. An interesting sidelight on Galen's involvement with Aristotelians is now provided by the recently-discovered *Avoiding distress*, where Aristotle and Aristotelians predominate in the list of texts which Galen himself, with meticulous attention to scholarly accuracy, 'had had transcribed afresh to provide almost a new edition' (*Ind.* 14, 6.18 Boudon-Millot, Jouanna and Pietrobelli, trans. Nutton); *cf.* Nutton's discussion of this Peripatetic focus in the list of manuscripts Galen worked on in the Palatine libraries, in his introduction to *Avoiding distress*, in *Galen: psychological writings*, ed. P. N. Singer (Cambridge 2013), and also in his appendix to the text of Chs 16-18 of *Avoiding distress*, in the same volume. This list, especially if one accepts the argument of Marwan Rashed in relation to the passage, and in particular his emendation, Clytus for Clitomachus ('Aristote à Rome au IIe siècle', *Elenchos* 32 (2011) 55-77 (57)), emphasizes not just the extent of Galen's scholarly knowledge of Aristotelianism, but more specifically his in-depth engagement with its earliest phase. In any case it

doubtless some connection (as Nutton suggests) between the Aristotelians of this narrative and the fact that Galen's work, especially *The function of the parts*, enjoyed a positive response in specifically Aristotelian circles.[15] Here again, the fact that Galen wishes to impress, appeal to, and (to some extent) defeat Aristotelian philosophers in argument does not mean that he is himself to be defined as a philosopher (or an Aristotelian). Indeed, that phrase 'the only one of the philosophers' can be seen as again underlining the way in which intellectual and ethical excellence actually set one apart from 'the philosophers'.

It is in certain other texts, however, that we find more explicit statements on Galen's part of his self-exclusion from the discipline of philosophy.

The affections and errors of the soul is, of course, a philosophical treatise. And the attacks on the mistakes made by other philosophers could, to some extent, be taken as attacks made by one philosopher against another – attacks on certain bad ways of doing philosophy. To an extent, of course, that is true: Galen is above all, as so often, attacking lack of logical rigour, rashness in jumping to a conclusion, and slavishness to the doctrines of a sect. But one must do justice to the number of passages in this text where 'the philosophers' is used as a negative term, and as a term which certainly excludes Galen himself. The 'philosophers' make declarations about good and bad.[16] Amongst those who avoid logical schooling are 'a number of those who claim to practise philosophy'.[17] And Galen describes discourses held, as to a distinct group, 'to many of the philosophers'.[18] As the treatise progresses, the extent to which 'philosophers' and 'philosophy' are treated, *tout court*, as negative terms seems to increase. 'Philosophy', its findings and its *theorêmata*, are contrasted with the logically-based method which leads to the truth;[19] 'people from philosophy' are equated with the intellectually inadequate and logically untrained followers of sects;[20] and, in the whole passage following that last quotation, in Chapters 5-7 of Book II of the work, the philosophers and their mode of conducting arguments cannot stand the scrutiny of other intelligent persons. In particular, the architect's explanation is understood by all 'except the philosophers'.[21] There is even

may be set alongside the information already available in Ch. 14 [ex-11] and 17 [ex-14] of *My own books*, detailing Galen's production of a range of commentaries on Aristotle, Theophrastus, and Eudemus, as well as indicating his knowledge of other Aristotelian commentators.

[15] V. Nutton, *Galeni De praecognitione*, ed., trans., and comm. V. Nutton, CMG 5.8,1 (Berlin 1979) 164.

[16] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.1, V.60 K = 42.18-19 de Boer. Not all of these conflicting definitions can be true, although it is possible that they are all false. It is not in fact clear whether Galen wishes to commit himself to any of the 'official' doctrines within the tradition; *cf.* my discussion *ad loc.* in Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above).

[17] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.3, V.71 K = 49.9 de Boer; *cf.* the reference to 'many who have grown old in philosophy', *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.3, V.75 K = 51.15 de Boer, and again to 'many who profess to do philosophy', *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.3, V.75 K = 51.23 de Boer.

[18] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.3, V.76 K = 52.6 de Boer.

[19] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.5, V.88 K = 59.23-27 de Boer.

[20] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.5, V.92 K = 62.6-7 de Boer.

[21] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.7, V.100 K = 66.23-24 de Boer.

(in my view, though the text is disputed) an explicit statement by Galen near the very end of the work that he is not a philosopher and does not do philosophy.[22]

In terms of the existing professional groups in his society, at least, Galen clearly does not want to put himself under the heading of 'philosopher'.

In *The shaping of the embryo*, in the context of a statement of his own ignorance of the actual identity of 'the shaper [of the body]', Galen again makes a sarcastic and distancing reference to 'the philosophers':

> Since *I* have shown that the constitution/construction (*kataskeuê*) of the body indicates the extreme wisdom and power of the one who made it, in the same way I beg the philosophers to show me [the identity of] the shaper, whether it be some wise and powerful god … or some soul separate from that of the god.
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> *Foet.Form.* 6, IV.687-88 K = 92.3-9 Nickel

Now, the question that Galen here poses is not one that he regards as pointless, or as the kind of quibble that only philosophers waste their time on. Indeed, as the progress of the argument from the point quoted to the end of the treatise makes clear, the question is a very real one for Galen. On the identity of the 'shaper' of the body, and on the related questions of the substance of the soul, and the way in which characteristics are communicated from parents to offspring, Galen is expressing a genuine and very puzzling *aporia*. None of the options so far suggested in this area is entirely satisfactory – let alone demonstrated by geometric-style proofs.[23] And that, indeed, is the force of his sideswipe here at 'the philosophers'. Galen has established something, at least, securely: the fact that the 'shaper' has extreme intelligence and power. To get greater precision on the matter, you might think you could turn to the philosophers. But the contrary is the case. They do not give secure demonstrations at all, 'nor even utter rhetorically persuasive arguments',[24] and Galen goes on to summarize the unreliability of their assumptions further.[25]

Galen is here using the term 'the philosophers' to characterize a kind of intellectual activity from which he wishes strongly to dissociate himself.

Now, that self-dissociation is interesting also because it touches on another subject, which has been discussed in recent scholarship, and it will be worth a brief digression to consider this. What I mean is: the extent to which Galen rejects certain kinds of enquiry as in their nature too abstract or speculative – as in themselves unknowable.[26] The rejection we have seen so far, especially in the text of *The shaping of the embryo*, is rather the rejection of a certain way of addressing those questions. In that case, as we have seen, Galen finds the

[22] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.7, V.103 K = 68.5-6 de Boer. The reading πλουσίων … πλουτοῦμεν seems to me clearly wrong, and Goulston's φιλοσόφων … φιλοσοφοῦμεν to be preferred (though the modern editors do not agree with me on this). So, the sense is: 'But the discussion [has been] about philosophers. Let us return to ourselves, who do not do philosophy …'.

[23] *Cf. Foet.Form.* 6, esp. IV. 699-702 K = 102-06 Nickel.

[24] *Foet.Form.* 6, IV.695 K = 100.6 Nickel.

[25] *Foet.Form.* 6, IV.698 K = 102.10-21 Nickel.

[26] *Cf.* the discussions of Peter Adamson and Riccardo Chiaradonna in the present volume (pp. 197-211, 61-88), which also touch on the passage mentioned in the next note.

questions themselves far from uninteresting, let alone meaningless: it is just that actual philosophers have (so far) had nothing to offer. They have not been able to add to Galen's own, securely based, knowledge on the subject, with its admitted limitations.

It is true that in a passage to which we have already alluded – Chapter 7 of Book II of *The affections and errors of the soul* – Galen seems to mock, as in themselves pointless, certain kinds of enquiry, such as that into the motion of 'bodies placed in the void'.[27] (Yet, even in this case, closer attention would suggest that it is the way the philosophers address the question, rather than the question itself, which is at fault.) One should simply not waste time, Galen seems at points to be saying, on subjects which are 'not necessary to understand either for cures of illnesses or for the preservation of health – nor even for ethical philosophy, [that which is] both practical and political'. Those are the words in which Galen expresses himself, while referring to his own ignorance of the identity of the substance (*ousia*) of the soul, in his summary, *My own doctrines*.[28] And, that particular statement of ignorance recurs pretty consistently throughout his work – sometimes in conjunction with a similar statement regarding the usefulness or not of different types of enquiry.[29] But one should not overstate this 'practical' or 'anti-metaphysical' quality in Galen. First, as we have seen, he is completely committed to a certain kind of theological position, in broad outline – it is just that he is unable to provide all the detail. In the above passage from *The shaping of the embryo*, it seems clear that he would like to provide that detail if he could. Both in this case and in that of those statements which we have just mentioned of the ignorance of the substance of the soul, one's exact interpretation will depend on one's understanding of Galenic irony; but, it seems to me that Galen is, in certain moods at least, expressing a genuine *aporia*, and a genuine wish that he could solve it.

The fact that the 'usefulness' test is not the central, or universal, one for Galen is in fact further supported by the very text to which we have just referred, *My own doctrines*. For while the words just cited seem to reflect a Galenic impatience with abstract enquiry, the passage in which they are situated, looked at in more detail, gives a rather different impression. A few pages earlier, discussing, now, the substance (*ousia*) not of the soul but of the capacities (*dunameis*) in general, Galen states his ignorance: he does not persuade himself, as others do, that he has secure knowledge of things of which he has not had a secure demonstration.[30] He goes on, however, to identify another category of enquiry, about which he does wish to speak: 'things whose knowledge is not necessary for health of the body or for the ethical virtues of the soul, but which would – if securely known – be

[27] *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 2.7, V.98 K = 65.16-21 de Boer. *Cf.* R. J. Hankinson's discussion of this passage in the context of his account of 'Galen on the limitations of knowledge', in *Galen and the world of knowledge* (n.12, above) 206-42 (229-30).

[28] *Prop.Plac.* 15, 120.5-10 Nutton = 189.12-15 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli = *Sub.Nat.Fac.* IV.764 K.

[29] As remarked by P. L. Donini, 'Psychology', in *The Cambridge companion to Galen*, ed. R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge 2008) 184-209 (185, with notes 9-11, usefully assembling the relevant passages).

[30] *Prop.Plac.* 14, 114.16-19 Nutton = 188.11-13 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli = *Sub.Nat.Fac.* IV.761 K.

an additional adornment (*epekosmêse*) to the things accomplished by medicine and ethical philosophy'.[31] He proceeds in this context to declare his views on element theory.

It is not, it seems to me, that certain kinds of enquiry are rejected because they are abstract or not of direct practical use (as we have just seen, Galen is capable of putting his own element theory in that category), or because they are metaphysical and not capable of completely precise answers (like the theory of intelligent design put forward in *The shaping of the embryo* and *The function of the parts*). What is rejected, rather – in either context – is the practice of purporting to put forward such precise answers, when, in fact, one has not got the demonstrations to support them. And that is precisely what 'the philosophers' actually do.

We have seen, then, a strong sense in which Galen identifies 'the philosophers' as a group to which he does not belong.

Of course, as I have already suggested, context is crucial. 'Being a philosopher' does not always mean the same thing: it may depend on whom one is talking to, whom one is talking about, and the particular claims one wishes to make for oneself – or not make for oneself – in a particular argumentative context. (One might compare the way in which a professional politician will at times dissociate him- or herself from the dirty activity of 'politics', or claim not to be acting or speaking 'politically'; in another context, or for another audience, the same person would of course not wish to be thought of as a bad or unskilled politician.) And the apparent contradiction here is in one sense easily enough resolved. The philosophical culture to which Galen wishes to align himself is that of Plato and (with certain reservations) Aristotle; that which he rejects is the debased philosophical culture of his own day, and in particular the slavish adherence to a particular sect. The sense in which 'the best doctor is also a philosopher' is that a serious enquiry into nature, and in particular into causes, must underlie medical theory and practice; the sense in which he is not is that it is of no value in Galen's view to engage in unanswerable speculations of the sort that present-day school philosophers do engage in. One might want to say that what Galen rejects here is not philosophy, but present-day actual philosophy. He does want to see himself as a philosopher, but an idealized one of the sort that no longer exists. Galen's independence of mind here – the fact that he refuses to define himself as part of a school – is important, and this much is often enough mentioned by Galenic scholars.

[31] *Prop.Plac.* 14, 114.19-27 Nutton = 188.13-17 Boudon-Millot and Pietrobelli = *Sub.Nat.Fac.* IV.761-62 K. And this aesthetic aspect – the beauty and value of knowledge of nature in its own right, irrespective of its precise usefulness – is surely supported by the well-known 'hymn' passage of Book 17 of *The function of the parts*; *cf.* esp. *UP* 17.1, IV.360-61 K = 2.447.21-448.5 Helmreich: '… he will understand the excellence of the intelligence in the heavens. Then a work on the usefulness of the parts … will be reckoned truly to be the source of a perfect theology, which is a thing far greater and far nobler than all of medicine. Hence such a work is serviceable not only for the physician, but much more for the philosopher who is eager to gain an understanding of the whole of Nature. And I think that all men … who honour the gods should be initiated into this work'; and *UP* 17.2, IV.362-63 K = 2.449.15-18 Helmreich: 'This is one very great advantage which we gain from this work, not as physicians, but, what is better, as men needing to understand something of the power responsible for usefulness' (trans. May).

That, it seems to me, is true as far as it goes; but it does not go far enough. For it seems to me that what Galen is, importantly, rejecting in the texts considered above is, in fact, the professional status of philosopher altogether. And this rejection has been less clearly stated, if not indeed overlooked. (It may, of course, be urged that to be a *professional* philosopher in Galen's time automatically involved the adherence to a school; and therefore that in rejecting sects he is, *ipso facto*, rejecting professional philosophy. Nonetheless, the fact that there is the latter rejection seems to me important in its own right.)

We should consider, then (albeit briefly), the question: if Galen does not define himself as a philosopher, what professional self-definition(s) would he accept? Well, that of a doctor, presumably. That, certainly, will be a correct answer as far as it goes; and there are not, as far as I know, any contexts in which Galen states definitely that he is *not* a doctor. The position in relation to certain other definitions, however, is more complex, and perhaps in need of more work. We have touched, for example, on the fact that the skills of a *grammatikos* are among those to which Galen would, at least in certain contexts, wish to lay claim. It seems to me, too, that, in spite of their obvious associations, such terms as *sophistês* and *rhêtôr* do not always or exclusively bear negative connotations in Galen. This last point is perhaps one which would merit further research.[32] Another kind of answer to the above question would be to say that – in the context of his own unique, intellectual project, or projects – there are a number of professional disciplines that Galen wishes to show himself both skilled in and distanced from.

With our finding regarding Galen's attitude to philosophy in mind, let us now turn to some of the works which are central to what people (including myself) have defined as Galen's Platonism.[33]

Galen's treatise *The capacities of the soul depend on the mixtures of the body* is particularly interesting here. Again, it is tempting to see the work as functioning in a sense

[32] The question, of course, has broader implications for Galen's relationship with the literary environment of the second century AD, and in particular the 'Second Sophistic' (whatever one thinks of the actual term) – something I cannot address here. I would refer the reader to Von Staden, 'Galen and the Second Sophistic' (n.12, above), both for the most detailed and compelling account of Galen's activity in this context and for references to the considerable literature in this area. On my specific point here, Von Staden discusses a number of negative references by Galen to *sophistês* and its cognates. But, as we have seen with 'philosophy', the sense of such references may vary according to context, and the situation may be rather more complex than at first appears.

[33] One may easily gain the impression (as has emerged from the discussion above, esp. n.14, and will emerge further below; *cf.* esp. pp. 20-25 with nn. 38, 45, and 61) that, both socially and by virtue of a number of points of intellectual contact, Galen might more happily have defined himself as an Aristotelian. The priority of Plato is, of course, explained in a fairly straightforward and mundane way by Galen's finding support for his own physiological and anatomical theories – especially his view of the brain – in Plato's tripartite psychology. A different kind of explanation, in terms of the particular kind of moral-intellectual (and even theological-intellectual) elite that Plato seems to represent for Galen, was explored in P. N. Singer, 'Aspects of Galen's Platonism', in *Galeno: obra, pensamiento e influencia*, ed. J. López Féres (Madrid 1991) 41-55 – which, however, doubtless overstates the centrality of Plato in Galen's thought. *Cf.* R. Chiaradonna, 'Galen and Middle Platonism', in *Galen and the world of knowledge* (n.12, above) 243-60 (243) for an overview of scholarly views in relation to Galen's Platonism.

within Platonism. Plato is the rhetorically central figure of the work; the central aim is to prove *to Platonists* that the body has influence on the soul; and all this seems to be in keeping with the fact that Galen's psychology, both here and elsewhere, is fundamentally Platonist.

But in fact, as I argue much more fully elsewhere, the hypothetical nature of the arguments here is a crucial feature of their structure.[34] Galen, for rhetorical purposes, adopts the hypotheses of different philosophers to demonstrate what should be, from their own point of view, the correct conclusions. If you are a Platonist, you are committed, as a consequence of a correct reading of Plato, to conclusion X; if an Aristotelian, to conclusion Y. Conclusion X here is, roughly, that 'the soul is (at least) slave to the mixtures of the body'; conclusion Y, that 'the substance of the soul actually is the mixture of the body'.[35] Galen is not, in fact, presenting himself *in propria persona* as subscribing to either of these positions; or to those of the Stoics or of Heraclitus, who are also brought within his authority-assimilating rhetoric. Now, the force of that rhetoric, to be sure, in pushing the reader towards certain kinds of conclusion – and indeed in giving the impression, at times, that Galen *does* subscribe to either the Platonist or the Aristotelian position that he has constructed on behalf of those schools – is, to say the least, considerable. Of course Galen is trying to show that both Plato and Aristotle, properly understood, support a Galenic position better than they support the views of their actual followers.

It is tempting to think that, when Galen talks disparagingly of certain 'self-styled Platonists' or 'noble Platonists' who misrepresent the Master,[36] and then goes on to put them right by detailed textual exegesis, he is using those terms to distinguish them from himself, the true Platonist. In reality, however, his argument is far more subtle than that. I am not a Platonist, Galen is saying (in spite of his approval of certain of his doctrines, in particular tripartition);[37] nor indeed an Aristotelian. But if I were a Platonist, or an Aristotelian, I would make a better job of it than those individuals actually do: I would argue more correctly on the basis of their texts. And in the process of this thought-

[34] In Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above), introduction to *The capacities of the soul.*

[35] I here summarize very crudely the argument of a text which is extremely subtle and sinuous; *cf.* (n.34, above).

[36] *QAM* 9, IV.805 K = 64.19-20 Müller; 10, IV.809 K = 68.18 Müller; 10, IV.811 K = 70.13-14 Müller.

[37] All the references to 'Platonists' in *The capacities of the soul* are in fact adversarial or at least critical: alongside those cited in the previous note, *cf.* the reference to 'Platonist teachers' at *QAM* 3, IV.775 K = 38.14 Müller. Furthermore, Galen addresses Plato himself in a critical or questioning spirit: *QAM* 3, IV.775 K = 38.4-13 Müller. Such evidence of a distanced, rather than always reverential, attitude to the great *palaios* tends to be overlooked; and further such evidence was supplied in n.7 above, in the context of the comparison with Hippocrates. One should consider in this light also the fact that Galen is quite capable of disagreeing with Plato in his one (partially) surviving commentary-style work on the philosopher, *Medical statements in the Timaeus* – as he presumably was also in some of the lost works whose titles he records, *e.g.* 'The Platonist sect' (in Ch. 16 [ex-13] of *My own books*) and 'Apparent self-contradictions in Plato's writings on the soul', not mentioned in *My own books* but in the (probably later) *The shaping of the embryo* (*Foet.Form.* 6, IV.700 K = 104.11-12 Nickel).

experiment we find (generally, but not always, and subject to important caveats about what views I am able to commit myself to) that their views turn out to be in agreement with my own. Detailed features of a somewhat similar argumentative stance, in the particular context of Aristotle's biological theory, have been analyzed by Philip van der Eijk. Galen criticizes Aristotelians for their misinterpretations of the master in a way which would superficially give the impression that he is presenting himself as a better Aristotelian. In a sense, that is true; but we also find that – even within the same work – Aristotle himself becomes the subject of Galen's, at times quite harsh, criticism.[38]

We have identified a rather complicated, but ultimately distanced, view towards the profession of philosophy, and towards philosophers, on Galen's part. With this in mind, let us turn to the second part of our discussion.

2. Galen and Aristotelian discussions

In this part of the paper, I wish to point to some of the peculiar ways in which this Galenic attitude towards philosophy and philosophers – simultaneously engaged and distanced – plays out in terms of some specific philosophical arguments. Basing our argument on a series of individual passages, we shall see that Galen is individualistic in some of his interpretations of what other philosophers have said; and that some of these interpretations, or summaries, have a vagueness, or slight imprecision, with regard to the original texts to which they seem to refer. Both these points – the individualism and the vagueness – are interesting in their own right. For present purposes, though, I shall consider them conjointly. Both seem to me to be signs of the way in which Galen (a) develops his own, independent and sometimes original, interpretation of philosophical texts – in particular, in the examples we consider, texts of Aristotle; (b) responds to discussions which he hears around him on the part of (especially) Platonists and Aristotelians, in some cases rather than consulting actual texts in detail.

Now, (a) and (b) may here co-exist and overlap, rather than necessarily being mutually exclusive explanations of a particular discussion in Galen. It should also be mentioned that (b) is a more speculative hypothesis than (a); and that, whatever particular view one may take in relation to (a) and (b), the transformations of Aristotle that emerge from the process are of considerable interest in their own right, as well as of considerable importance for Galen's thought.

In the examples that follow, I shall not try in each individual case to separate the two phenomena (a) and (b). What would be at issue in such a separation would be the extent to which such original, and/or vague, formulations of philosophers' views result from Galen's own response to his reading of a philosopher, as opposed to the extent to which they result from the way in which such texts were discussed and summarized by others at Galen's time. And the answer to this (leaving aside certain concrete parallels between Galen's formulations and those found in other texts in the Aristotelian tradition of around his time, as we discuss below) would be inevitably speculative. I believe, however, that it

[38] P. J. van der Eijk, '"Aristotle! What a thing for you to say!" Galen's engagement with Aristotle and Aristotelians', in *Galen and the world of knowledge* (n.12, above) 261-81 (277-78) (discussing in particular the argument of Galen's *De semine*).

will emerge from what follows that we do seem to be looking at the traces, however shadowy, of discussions and summaries of philosophers that were part of the (partly oral) culture of Galen's time. In this sense, the results are interesting – though, as already admitted, shadowy – in that they function to some extent as a pre-echo of the later, very well-documented, commentary tradition on Plato and Aristotle.

Galen, of course, makes explicit mention of this commentary tradition, or of figures within it; but such remarks are scattered and fairly inconclusive in their import. The fact that Galen attended the lectures of a 'Platonist pupil of Gaius', during his youth in Pergamum; and then later, in Smyrna, those of 'Albinus the Platonist' may or may not be of significance for some of the ways in which Galen reads Plato.[39] Galen mentions a specifically Aristotelian teacher, again from the time in Pergamum: 'a pupil of Aspasius the Peripatetic'.[40] We do not know any other details of this pupil. As regards Aspasius himself, although we do have substantial portions of his passages of his commentary on Aristotle's *Ethics*, it does not seem possible to make any clear link between the summarization of Aristotle's views given there and what we find in Galen.

To continue with Galen's explicit references to the Aristotelian commentary tradition: one very clear reference he makes is to the much earlier figure – indeed, the father of Aristotelian commentary – Andronicus. Attributing to him a specific doctrine, Galen 'approve[s] him highly' and adds that he finds him 'similar in many other areas, too'.[41] The sentence represents a fascinating but frustrating glimpse into what *may* have been a significant relationship. But again, it is not possible to establish (on the basis of the fragmentary evidence we have for him) how important that commentator actually was for Galen.[42] Then, there is the major Aristotelian commentator who was a near-contemporary of Galen's, Alexander of Aphrodisias. Alexander is not mentioned by Galen but, as recent scholarship has shown, seems to be connected with him in some interesting ways – at least co-representing some common strands of Aristotelianism, and possibly being influenced by him (though most scholars here would reject a reverse influence *of* Alexander *upon* Galen).[43]

[39] 'Platonist pupil of Gaius': *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 1.8, V.41 K = 28.12 de Boer; Albinus the Platonist: *Lib.Prop.* 2, XIX.16 K = 140.16 Boudon-Millot. *Cf.* also below, 36, for a reference in *The shaping of the embryo* to 'one of my Platonist teachers'.

[40] Aspasius: *Aff.Pecc.Dig.* 1.8, V.42 K = 28.16 de Boer; he is also mentioned in Ch. 14 [ex-11] of *My own books*, alongside Adrastus, as an example of a commentator who may play a useful role in a student's Aristotelian education (*Lib.Prop.* XIX.43 = 167.6 Boudon-Millot).

[41] *QAM* 4, IV.782 K = 44.12-18 Müller.

[42] *Cf.* H. B. Gottschalk, 'Aristotelian philosophy in the Roman world from the time of Cicero to the end of the second century AD', in *ANRW* 2.36.2, ed. W. Haase (Berlin and New York 1987) 1079-1184 for what we know of Andronicus.

[43] See now I. Kupreeva, 'Aristotelian dynamics in the 2nd century school debates: Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias on organic powers and movements', in *Philosophy, science and exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin commentaries*, eds P. Adamson, H. Baltussen, and M. W. F. Stone, *Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies Supplement* 83.1-2, 2 vols (London 2004) I 71-95, both for a recent analysis of similarities between Galen and Alexander and (1, with n.1) an overview of the *status quaestionis*. Relevant discussions of Alexander, and of Galen in relation to him, are also

It is interesting in this context again to remind ourselves of the number of people whom Galen mentions from his Roman milieu who are adherents of Aristotelianism. The point was made above in our overview of the treatise *Prognosis* (*cf.* esp. n.14). Of the Aristotelians mentioned in the autobiographical context there, one may, as we saw, have been an actual teacher of Galen, and another, Boethus, recurs as an important figure at other points in Galen's life.[44] Again, any notion of influence from, or indeed interaction with, these individuals on specific areas of Galen's thought would be highly speculative. The fact, however, that they were in his social circle at least serves to give some background support to the argument of the present article, in the sense that it reinforces the likelihood of his having spent some considerable time listening to the discussions of contemporary Peripatetics.

In this context, I should distinguish several subjects which I am *not* aiming to deal with in what follows – subjects which are beyond the rather specific aims I have in view, and which, in any case, have already received more or less extensive discussion in recent literature. In particular, I do not aim to give any general overview of Galen's indebtedness to Aristotle nor to enter into the complex question of his relationship with the extant commentary tradition, in particular with Alexander. In the former case, I believe that an increasing consciousness of this indebtedness is of considerable importance, especially in the biological and physical areas of Galen's thought; this has been very well brought out recently by Philip van der Eijk.[45] In the latter case, too, the interesting areas of intellectual

in P. L. Donini, *Tre studi sull'aristotelismo nel II secolo d. C.* (Turin 1974); *id.*, 'Motivi filosofici in Galeno', *La parola del passato* 194 (1980), 333-70; *id.*, *Le scuole, l'anima, l'impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino* (Turin 1982); *id.*, 'Il "De fato" di Alessandro: questioni di coerenza', in *ANRW* 2.36.2 (n.42, above) 1244-59 (1248-49); R. B. Todd, 'Galenic medical ideas in the Greek Aristotelian commentators', *Symbolae Osloenses* 52 (1977) 117-34; P. Accattino, 'Ematopoiesi, malattia cardiaca e disturbi mentali in Galeno e Alessandro di Afrodisia', *Hermes* 115 (1987) 454-69; *id.*, *Alessandro di Afrodisia, De anima II (Mantissa)* (Alessandria 2005); P. Accattino and P. Donini, *Alessandro d'Afrodisia: L'anima* (Bari 1996), esp. (introduction) vi; M. Bergeron and R. Dufour, *Alexandre d'Aphrodisie: De l'âme, texte grec introduit, traduit et annoté* (Paris 2008); R. W. Sharples, 'Alexander of Aphrodisias: scholasticism and innovation', in *ANRW* 2.36.2 (n.42, above) 1176-1243, esp. 1179 with notes 18-21 and 1203 with notes 79-81; Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Supplement to On the soul*, trans. R. W. Sharples (London 2004); Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *De anima libri mantissa*, ed., with intro. and comm. by R. W. Sharples (Berlin 2008); T. Tieleman, 'The hunt for Galen's shadow: Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. pp. 94.7-100.17 Bruns reconsidered', in *Polyhistor: studies in the history and historiography of Greek philosophy presented to Jaap Mansfeld on his 60th birthday*, eds K. Algra, D. T. Runia, and P. W. van der Horst (Leiden 1996) 265-83; S. Fazzo, 'Alexandre d'Aphrodisie contre Galien: la naissance d'une légende', in: *Philosophie antique: problèmes, renaissances, usages* 2 (2002) 109-44.

[44] The text from *Avoiding distress* cited in n.14 above points to an active scholarly engagement with some of these Aristotelian figures.

[45] In van der Eijk, '"Aristotle! What a thing for you to say!" (n.38, above), which also gives a good account of previous work in this area.

congruence have been given a very full discussion by recent scholars.[46] My present discussion focuses on the obviously related, but rather more elusive, areas where Galen is reflecting contemporary debates in a way *not* directly reflected in extant commentary texts, especially those of Alexander.

Finally, I do not enter here (except very much in passing) into the question of Galen in relation to 'Middle Platonism' – again a subject much discussed in recent years.[47] This is not because I take the subject to be exhausted. It happens that the specific examples I concentrate on here relate mostly to Galen's relationship with an Aristotelian, rather than a Platonist, discourse. But this does not represent anything like an exhaustive account of Galen's engagement with contemporary debates; and I suspect, in fact, that further interesting connections may emerge between Galen and some of the specific formulations that appear in some of his Platonist contemporaries or near-contemporaries.

Examples

1. We take our first example from *The capacities of the soul depend upon the mixtures of the body* – the most well-known and well-discussed text in the context of Galen's engagement with Aristotelianism. As already stated, I do not intend here to discuss the nature of Galen's relationship with known literary figures, either from the period before or that after his own time. It may, however, be worth summarizing the most striking 'Aristotelian' positions that have been discussed in this text. There are in fact two key passages, which offer closely related, but distinct, arguments in relation to the Aristotelian definition of the soul. The first, in Chapter 3, relies on the Aristotelian notion of soul as form of the body; and argues from that, via some categories in Aristotelian-Galenic biology, to the equation of form in this particular sense with mixture. The second, in Chapter 4, is the passage already touched on above, where Galen attributes to Andronicus the view that the substance of the soul is 'either a mixture or a capacity dependent on mixture'. (Without, as I have said, going into the details of the Galen-Alexander relationship, let us remind ourselves that it is this 'capacity-dependent-on-mixture' view which is one of the central points which seems to connect the Galenic text with the tradition represented by Alexander.)

For our present purposes it is the former passage which is the more interesting.[48] It may be worth citing a part of it verbatim:

[46] *Cf.* n.43 above. Connections with the Aristotelian commentary tradition are also surveyed in Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above), introduction to *QAM*.

[47] Most recently by Chiaradonna, 'Galen and Middle Platonism' (n.32, above), who gives a negative account of Galen's 'Middle Platonism', but at the same time a very useful survey of the literature. In addition to the works he cites, *cf.* also P. N. Singer, *Galen on the soul: philosophy and medicine in the second century* AD (unpublished doctoral thesis, University of Cambridge 1992); and Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above), general introduction.

[48] The passage is complex, the text not completely certain, the argument extremely compressed, and its progress not easy to follow. See further my notes *ad loc.* in Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above).

> So that when this very man, Aristotle, says that the soul is form of the body, one must ask him – or his followers – whether we should understand 'form' here to have been used by him in the sense of shape, as in the organic bodies, or in the sense of the other principle of natural bodies, that which crafts a body which is 'homoiomerous' and simple in terms of our perception of it.
>
> *QAM* 3, IV.773-74 K = 37.5-12 Müller

There are, it seems to me, two hints at the fact that Galen's engagement with Aristotle here is a rather informal one, dependent either on a somewhat distant relationship with an actual text, or perhaps on summarizations of Aristotle that he has frequently heard in discussion. One hint is in the very way that the engagement with Aristotle is mentioned: 'when … Aristotle … says … one must ask him – or his followers'. Galen clearly here does have in mind a group of actual Aristotelians that one could question; we may gain the impression that he has them, *rather than* an actual text of Aristotle, in mind. That is, indeed, no more than an impression. Let us then consider the second hint. This is the vague way in which Aristotle's definition is cited: 'when he says that soul is form of the body'. If Galen has a precise text in mind, it must be *De anima* 412a19-21: 'it is necessary, then, that the soul be substance in the sense of form of a natural body which has the capacity for life' (ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος). Galen's is an abbreviated formulation of Aristotle's position here. How much distortion arises from the abbreviation is debatable; it seems to me at least possible to argue that a citation of the full sentence would make Galen's argument more difficult at this point in his text.

I do not have space to elaborate that suggestion in detail here. But one might consider, for example, that the way in which the term *ousia* appears in this passage, with its attendant implication that the term may be understood in a plurality of senses, as well as its identity in a particular sense with *psuchê*, would, at least, sit awkwardly with the precise terms in which Galen discusses *psuchê* and *ousia* in *The capacities of the soul*. In the latter text (and elsewhere) the question for Galen is 'what is *the substance* (*ousia*) of the *psuche*?' The notion that the *psuchê* actually *is* an *ousia* is not explored; and this (as also, perhaps, the notion that there might be more than one way of understanding the term *ousia* itself in such a context) would doubtless complicate the terms of his argument. To move to the second half of the Aristotelian sentence: the polysemic nature of *eidos* is, indeed, mentioned by Galen; here, however, it must be doubtful whether the present context of the term – 'of a natural body with the capacity for life' – would readily be felt to support Galen's identification of *eidos* with mixture. The apparent reference of these words to a whole animal organism, with the structural or 'higher-level' considerations that (even for Galen) this would seem to involve, would seem to speak against such an interpretation.

But, leaving aside the complexities of Aristotelian interpretation, how significant is Galen's abbreviation of the text in terms of what it tells us of Galen's relationship with Aristotle's *De anima*? To accuse Galen of a cursory knowledge – or at least of something less than an in-depth, recent study – of an important text of Aristotle might seem audacious, given his ability to quote from Aristotle verbatim and at considerable length; and especially so since this very text, *The capacities of the soul*, is one in which this ability is demonstrated to the highest degree.

But it is, I would suggest, precisely this contrast between the way in which the relevant passage of *De anima* is cited, on the one hand, and those verbatim quotations, on the other, which is striking. There is no doubting Galen's detailed study of and familiarity with Aristotle, especially in the area of the biological works. The importance, and detailed knowledge, of these works on Galen's part, abundantly evidenced by *The capacities of the soul*, were discussed in detail by Moraux; the point has been reiterated recently by Philip van der Eijk.[49] There is, indeed, a range of Aristotelian texts that are important for Galen, and fairly often quoted by him. The most prominent of these (in *The capacities of the soul* and elsewhere) is *Parts of animals*; but, there are others with which he is also closely familiar. Indeed, as we have already seen, Galen's in-depth knowledge of texts, not just of Aristotle but of his early disciples, and of the commentary tradition, is extensive and scholarly, reaching far beyond the limits of those texts which he directly refers to in biological or scientific contexts.[50]

When it comes to *De anima*, we have no direct verbatim quotation in *The capacities of the soul* (where its argument is of particular importance to him); nor, with one exception that I am aware of,[51] elsewhere. I would suggest, albeit tentatively, that it may also be the case that there is no text of Galen's which relies on an in-depth knowledge of the argument of that work.

This situation is, indeed, quite remarkable when one considers the theoretical importance to Galen of Aristotelian psychology. For Galen, in a sense, presents his view of the soul as consistent with Aristotle just as much as with Plato: they are using different

[49] P. Moraux, 'Galen and Aristotle's *De partibus animalium*', in *Aristotle on nature and living things: philosophical and historical studies presented to David M. Balme on his seventieth birthday*, ed. A. Gotthelf (Pittsburgh and Bristol 1985) 327-44; van der Eijk, '"Aristotle! What a thing for you to say!" (n.38, above).

[50] *Cf.* esp. n.14 above. The material in Ch. 14 [ex-11] of *My own books* highlights largely Galen's logical interests in relation to Aristotle, while the recently-discovered material in *Avoiding distress* (esp. 16-17), puts Peripatetic biological interests – the works on plants – in the foreground; but of course this latter fact may simply be because Galen is here focussing on works whose loss was most important, because of their rarity. It would be very strange to suppose that the *De anima* was *not* in Galen's personal library, let alone in that of the Palatine libraries (especially if, as Rashed ('Aristote à Rome', n.14, above) suggests, the latter holding may have been that originally belonging to the school of Aristotle and removed from Greece to Rome by Sulla); and of course its availability in general at this period is not in question, as witnessed by the work of *e.g.* Alexander of Aphrodisias. The lack of detailed engagement with the work which I am here suggesting would therefore presumably have to be seen as reflecting Galen's personal intellectual tastes, or selective reading. But in any case, the fact that Galen does not make explicit reference to the *De anima* or its commentaries in such bibliographical contexts is striking.

[51] The only case of an actual mention of, or verbatim citation from, the *De anima* cited by Moraux in his very useful overview of the Aristotelian texts Galen uses (P. Moraux, *Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias. Zweiter Band: Der Aristotelismus im I. und II. Jh. n. Chr.* (Berlin and New York 1984) 729-35) is an isolated passage of *Inst.Od.* (5, II.871 K). There a passage of Book II of *De anima* is cited in the very specific context of the physiological and anatomical account of perception – a use which does not alter one's view of Galen's non-engagement, in detail, with the philosophical/psychological arguments of that work.

terminology to describe the same thing. This point indeed leads us to another specific example of Galenic interpretation of Aristotle, which may be relevant to the nature of his engagement with the *De anima*. That is the equation of Aristotle's 'nutritive' with Plato's 'desiderative' soul. The assimilation is, as others have pointed out, an absolutely key feature of Galen's project (especially in *PHP*), to construct a model whereby Galen's own views about biology and physiology are mapped onto Plato's tripartite soul.[52] This intellectual move has much broader implications, to do with Galen's decontextualizing and assimilating procedures in relation to his sources;[53] what is of interest to us here is one particular aspect of this decontextualization. For (again without getting too deeply into interpretive questions on Aristotle's *De anima*) we may say that in Book III of that work the 'nutritive' appears in a context which seems to some extent actually critical of the limitations of Platonic tripartition, and of the Platonic category of 'desiderative', and certainly in the framework of a discussion of animal (and plant) capacities which is not in any straightforward sense mapped, or mappable, onto the tripartite account.[54] We have here, perhaps, a creative distortion or mis-remembering; and, again, it is not entirely clear how closely such a procedure could be paralleled from elsewhere in the Platonic, or Aristotelian, tradition.[55]

Galen's ability to engage with, and indeed have a scholarly response to, texts of Aristotle is not in question. What I am arguing, rather, is that there are (at least) two levels of response to Aristotle in Galen: one, in which he cites a text *in extenso* and bases an argument on that citation; another, in which his reference to an Aristotelian position is altogether more vague. One may, of course, in the latter case, suspect that what is in play is not just a less thorough involvement with the text in question, but a tendency to quote selectively. (I would suggest, however, that the two phenomena are rather more subtly intertwined – that is to say, that Galen has, as a result of his own particular intellectual enthusiasms, gained a particularly close knowledge of certain texts at the expense of others.)

[52] *Cf.* M. Vegetti, 'Tradition and truth: forms of philosophical-scientific historiography in Galen's *De placitis*', in *Ancient histories of medicine: essays in medical doxography and historiography in classical antiquity*, ed. P. J. van der Eijk (Leiden 1999) 333-57. The assimilation is also discussed in Singer, *Galen on the soul* (n.47, above) and Singer, *Galen: psychological writings* (n.14, above).

[53] A seminal analysis of this procedure, still worthy of study, is P. Manuli, 'Traducibilità e molteplicità dei linguaggi nel *De placitis* di Galeno', in *Storiografia e dossografia nella filosofia antica*, ed. G. Cambiano (Turin 1986) 245-65.

[54] See esp. *De an.* 431a24-432b7.

[55] Relevant here is the point made by T. Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the soul: argument and refutation in the De placitis Books II-III* (Leiden 1996) xxv n.48: he sees a similarity between Galen's Aristotelianism and that of the scholastic tradition, whereby three forms of conation are equated with the three Platonic parts; but then adds that Galen 'flouts the usual and important distinction that Aristotle employed this division [*sc.* volition, anger, desire] in his ethical work only'. In a sense, then, Tieleman's argument here also seems to support an assertion of the uniqueness of Galen's Platonic-Aristotelian synthesis. Similarly with regard to Galen's tendentious interpretation of Plato as placing the desiderative soul in the liver, the evidence that Tieleman brings forward (*ibid.*, xxix-xxxi, with notes) seems largely to support Galen's originality, although he finds some apparent parallels for Galen's point of view in the Platonic tradition.

2. Our next example comes from Book II of *De sanitate tuenda*. This is a work which contains much of interest on matters of soul and body and their complex interrelationship in the context of upbringing and daily regime. It also has some particularly interesting material on the spirited part of the soul (*thumos*, *thumoeides*) and its relationship with the heart and the internal heat. The specific passage I want to look at now comes in the context of a discussion of exercise (*gumnasia*). Almost in passing, Galen finds himself addressing the relative value of descriptions of certain psychological events in physical and in mental terms:

> And this [*sc.* an increase in innate heat, arising from the bodies themselves] is common to all exercises; but it is not specific to them, since, indeed, an increase in innate hotness arises also in those experiencing rage (*thumôtheisi*), anxiety (*agôniasasi*) and shame (*aidestheisin*). Now, rage (*thumos*) is not simply an increase, but as it were a kind of boiling of the hot in the heart; which is why the best-reputed philosophers state such to be the essence (*ousia*) of it [*sc.* rage]; for the appetite for revenge is an incidental feature (*sumbebêkos*) and not the essence of the rage. The internal heat increases in those suffering shame too, as all of the hot courses together to the inside, and then gathers deep down, and then increases both because of that gathering and because of the constant motion. For the breath (*pneuma*) is not at rest in people in a state of shame, but is stirred about (*kukatai*) all over the place both inside and about itself, just as it is in people in a state of anxiety.
>
> *San.Tu.* 2.9, VI.138-39 K = 61.21-34 Koch

As so often in Galen, what appears to be a crucial philosophical point is summarized in a sentence (the second one quoted above) – in fact, in an aside. What Galen seems to be saying here is that, with regard to at least some mental states (or, in his terms – though he does not use the term in this particular passage – *pathê*), one should prioritize a definition which picks out the key physical events taking place in the body; that phenomena we refer to by certain psychological terms – rage, shame, anxiety – have precise physical correlates, the description of which, in fact, represent better definitions of those phenomena than definitions relying on mental or intentional terms. This is not the place to explore all the implications of this fascinating passage, its relationship with other passages in Galen which appear to discuss the 'mental' and 'physical' aspect of the same event, or whether the kind of view outlined here is one which he could hope to maintain consistently. It is, for our purposes, the doxographical aspect of the passage which is of most interest – the reference to 'the best-reputed philosophers'. Who, exactly, are these persons to whom Galen attributes the view that 'the boiling of the hot in the heart is the essence of rage'?

There is much here that puts one in mind of Aristotle. The terms in which the distinction is couched, between 'incidental feature' and 'essence', are themselves Aristotelian. (The latter term, *ousia*, referring to the key definitional element in a subject, is of course the same as that translated 'substance' in our first example, from *The capacities of the soul*; and indeed there seems an interesting connection between the usage here and that one, regarding the 'substance of the soul'.) If, however, one takes what Galen says literally, it seems difficult to identify this specific proposition with something that can be clearly attributed to a particular philosopher (let alone a whole group of the 'best-reputed').

Beyond the general Aristotelianism of the terminology, however, there is a specific passage in Aristotle that has such verbal similarities to this Galenic one that it is difficult to imagine that the latter is not a response to the former. Again it is a passage from the *De anima*, this time from Book I. Aristotle is, in fact, addressing this same question, of mental and physical descriptions of *pathê*, and the correct way to understand the relationship between the two. The sentences which Galen seems to echo run as follows:

> So a *phusikos* and a dialectician would define each of them [*sc.* affections of the soul], such as what anger is, differently: the latter would [define it as] the appetite (*orexin*) for retaliation, or something of that sort, while the former would define it as the boiling (*zesin*) of blood and of the hot around the heart. Of these, the one gives the matter, the other the form or account (*logos*). For the account is the form of the thing, and this must be [realized] in a certain kind of matter, if it is to be …
>
> *De an.* 403a29-403b2

But the echo is a subtly distorting one. We have the same contrast as Galen's between a definition in terms of desire for revenge and one in terms of heat; and indeed we have close similarities in terminology: *zesis* (boiling), *orexis* (appetite). But Galen's claim that the account in terms of the material conditions captures the 'essence' is wrong, for Aristotle. Although this passage does not in fact use the term *ousia* in this context, it is, in Aristotle's view, the dialectician who captures the *eidos* or *logos* of anger – and these definitional terms here refer to the mental aspect of the *pathos*. Aristotle is here rather far from associating the *ousia* of anger with the boiling of blood. Now, it is also true, as the passage immediately preceding that quoted makes clear, that the mental aspect encapsulated by this *eidos* is always embodied or 'enmattered'. But here again Galen's discussion shifts the Aristotelian emphasis significantly, because in the passage immediately *following* that quoted, Aristotle asserts the superiority of an account which would capture both the formal (*i.e. eidos*-based) and the material in a single formula. (Such a person would in fact be the true *phusikos*, *De an.* 403b7-12.) Galen, in this passage which seems so closely to echo Aristotle's, has, in fact, fundamentally altered his two central perceptions: (i) that it is the mental, not the physical, account which gives an affection's essential nature; (ii) that we should aim, ultimately, to get beyond that opposition, and arrive at an account which includes both elements.

The specific formulation 'appetite for revenge', meanwhile, seems to have Stoic echoes. For the precise term which Galen uses for 'revenge' (*antitimôrêsis*) does not derive from the passage of Aristotle (where the equivalent term is *antilupêsis*). This variation could, of course, be a further instance of Galen's slightly vague memory of the text. But it may, rather, reflect a Stoic formulation, and indicate that it is a Stoic view which (he believes) he is here attacking. A term related to *antitimôrêsis* – *e.g. timôria*, *timôrêsasthai* – seems to have been used in a standard Stoic definition of anger: it is the desire for such 'revenge' on the part of one who believes himself wronged.[56] It is probable, then, that he is here trying, as is so often his practice, to line up 'the best philosophers' behind him and against the position that he wishes to criticize. And it does

[56] Stobaeus 2.91.10 = *SVF* 3.395 and [Pseudo]-Andronicus, *Peri Pathôn* 4 = *SVF* 3.397.

seem too – though the phrase 'best-reputed philosophers' is vague, and Galen might not wish to be pinned down on it – that the only plausible people that Galen might have in mind here are Aristotle and/or Aristotelians.

If that is right, we have here a clear distortion of Aristotle's view. To what extent that represents Galen's own creative 'take' on Aristotle, and to what extent it may have been informed by Aristotelians' summaries, must again remain speculative. What does seem to emerge fairly clearly, however, is – again – a certain vagueness on Galen's part in relation to the text of the *De anima*.

3. Galen has a propensity to raise extraordinarily difficult philosophical questions, and to make extraordinarily distinctive responses to them, in extraordinarily brief passages of his work. Another such example – or rather, pair of such examples – comes in *Mixtures*. The passages, respectively from Book I and Book II of the work, are as follows:

> [T]he man who is 'well-fleshed' to this degree is not just in the middle state with regard to moisture and dryness, but has also got an excellent shaping – something which may possibly be dependent on the good mixture of the four elements, but perhaps has some other source of a more divine nature, from above.
>
> *Temp.* 1.9, I.566-67 K = 36.20-24 Helmreich

> [A] second way [in which they err (*sc.* the medical-philosophical schools of thought under discussion) is] that they do not regard the power in nature that shapes us as a craftsmanlike power, which shapes the parts in a way which is a consequence of the character traits of the soul. On this point even Aristotle was in some doubt [*or*, raised a query] (*êporêse*): whether this power may not derive from some more divine source, rather than just that found in the hot, the cold, the dry and the wet. Those who make a rash assertion on this greatest of issues, attributing the shaping to the physical qualities alone, seem to me to act wrongly. For surely these latter are only the instruments by which it takes place, while the actual *shaper* is something else.
>
> *Temp.* 2.6, I.635-36 K = 79.20-29 Helmreich

The passages are of enormous interest for Galen's views of causation in nature. Again, this is not the place to address the detailed problems of their interpretation, and of the relationship between these texts and others addressing causal questions in Galen's work. These questions have now, in any case, received a certain level of scholarly attention; and the passages just cited are discussed in depth by Philip van der Eijk in the present volume.[57] What concerns us here, rather, is again the interpretation of Aristotle which Galen gives – implicitly in the first passage, but quite explicitly in the second. Galen here presents something like an 'either-or' view of causal powers: when it comes to explaining the structural, or 'shaping', process by which human beings come to be, we must *either* attribute this merely to fundamental elements, *or* invoke a higher-level cause – something which in the first passage is referred to as 'some other source of a divine nature, from

[57] *Cf.* P. N. Singer, 'Levels of explanation in Galen', *Classical Quarterly* 47 (1997) 525-42; and below, 89-134.

above' and in the second as 'some more divine source'. In the first passage, he seems open-minded as to which is the correct answer; the second seems to make clear that he favours the higher, 'divine' option (at least to account for some of the relevant phenomena). And it is the second passage, too, that attributes such a view to Aristotle. The precise terms in which he does so are of particular interest – in particular, the verb *êporêse*. This could be taken to mean 'was in doubt'; in a commentary context, however, the verb may also simply mean 'raise a question'. In either case, Aristotle is here being stated to have raised, as an explicit problem, the question as to which of two models of causal explanation should be adopted, in the specific context of the shaping of human bodies: material causation on the four-element theory, or causation from a divine source.

Of course, causal questions in Aristotle are famously complicated and have generated an immense modern literature; and one is loath to attempt any summary in such an area. But it does seem, again, that the specific statement here attributed to Aristotle – that he *êporêse* on this particular subject – is difficult to locate in Aristotle's actual work. That divine intelligence and material elements co-exist as causal agents could be taken as a reasonable interpretive statement of Aristotle's biological work. Even here, though, the terminology is not, in detail, precisely Aristotelian. Both the terms 'more divine' and 'from above' seem to represent vague allusions to (what Galen takes to be) Aristotle's position, rather than attributable citations – or at least, rather than attributable citations to an argument which is recognizably the same as the Galenic one.[58] Galen's summarizations can hardly be said to map precisely on to any particular Aristotelian discussion of causation in the biological world. On the other hand, they could be said to provide a rough characterization of what is going on in those different causal accounts –

[58] I am grateful to Philip van der Eijk for pointing out to me the similarity between *anôthen* and the somewhat similar term *thurathen*, which Aristotle uses in the rather different context of the relationship of *nous* to the rest of the soul in *De generatione animalium*. Actually, this same text does present some kind of verbal parallel, both for 'from above' and for 'more divine'. But again, if one looks in detail at these pre-echoes, it is the differences in argumentative context and intent that are as striking as the similarities. At *GA* 2.1, 731b23-24, Aristotle uses the very phrase, *anôthen echei tên archên* – 'has its source from above'; but the context here is the picking-out of the final cause ('because of the better, for the sake of something'), which is to be understood *alongside* the material or efficient causes. Then, at *GA* 2.3, 736b21-33, it is specified that reason alone (*nous*) enters from outside (*thurathen*) and alone is divine (*theion*), for bodily activity has nothing in common with it. This separate, and non-bodily, status of, specifically, *nous*, belongs to a different area of discussion from that which Galen is addressing in *De temperamentis*. (It is also true, incidentally, that the Aristotelian term *nous* is one hardly employed by Galen in his philosophical psychology.) This latter passage from *GA* continues – in what again seems a clear verbal pre-echo of the *De temperamentis* – to suggest that 'the power of all soul has to do with *another* body, *more divine* (*theioterou*) than the so-called elements'. But again, the direction of Aristotle's argument seems quite different from that of Galen's: the former goes on to assert that differences between different souls in scale of value (*timiotêti kai atimiâi*) will be reflected in their physical nature (*phusis*) – and thus seems to be attempting to reconcile an account in terms of 'the divine' with one in terms of physical substrate. Indeed, it is a particular kind of *body* that is 'more divine' in this Aristotelian text. And yet, again, the terms of Aristotle's discussion are somehow distantly reflected in Galen's.

albeit, perhaps, a characterization which may appear somewhat philosophically unsophisticated.

And it is here, I think, that we have what is the most striking feature of Galen's version of Aristotle at this point, precisely in the fact that he presents him as offering an either-or distinction between models of causation, and a hesitation between them. Now it may or may not be the case that we as readers experience some difficulty in reconciling the different causal accounts that Aristotle gives: the language of 'for-the-sake-of', on the one hand, and the accounts in terms of, *e.g.* qualities of the blood, on the other. But it seems pretty clear that Aristotle does not himself see the accounts as conflicting. Indeed, as the above quotation from *De anima* makes clear, he is – at least in principle – committed to the notion of an account which simultaneously captures the material and 'higher' levels of explanation. (The *De anima* passage may not be dealing with exactly the same causal issues that we are here discussing, but it is indicative of the kind of account which Aristotle believes a student of nature should give.) It is, at least, a possible reading of Aristotle's *Parts of animals* (as we have seen, a crucial text for Galen) that Aristotle there concentrates on material causation in a way which is difficult to reconcile with formal or teleological causation. Yet, even if one follows such a reading, one would have to say that, far from highlighting any such 'aporia' arising from different causal mechanisms, Aristotle seems, if anything, to avoid addressing any such 'direction-of-causation' problem head-on.

Here, too, then, we have Galen's very particular – one is tempted to say, creative – take on Aristotle.[59] And here, too, I suggest, it is difficult to be sure to what extent this very particular take is due to Galen himself and to what extent it is due to summarizations or simplifications of Aristotle that existed in Galen's milieu.

We might pause for a moment here, and consider together the three examples of 'transformation of Aristotle' given so far, since they have something very significant in common – significant for the way in which Galen reads Aristotle, and perhaps for his thought more generally. For each of these three examples is, in a way, also an example of Galen's failure to understand what we would see as an absolutely crucial feature of Aristotle – basically, his hylomorphism. In suggesting the equation of bodily mixture and form; in positing a state of blood as the essence of rage (in contradistinction to an account in mental terms); in claiming that Aristotle raised the question of whether a material or a 'higher' account should be given of human formation – in each of these cases, Galen seems to show that he misses something central to Aristotle's thought in this area. If we were to summarize Aristotle's position by saying that a form (*eidos*), or indeed an essence (*ousia*), is neither identical with any particular materials, nor something distinct from or outside it, but inheres in or is instantiated in particular materials, we would, I think, simultaneously be summarizing (to put it negatively) the concept which is, at points at

[59] It would be interesting, though beyond our scope here, to set Galen's remarks on alternative views of causation quoted above from *Mixtures* alongside the discussion (also Aristotelian in its inspiration) of the different types of cause in *Antecedent causes* and *Containing causes* and to consider to what extent there too he is suggesting an 'either-or' approach to certain causal explanations. The views of those texts are summarized by R. J. Hankinson, 'Philosophy of nature', in *The Cambridge companion to Galen*, ed. R. J. Hankinson (Cambridge 2008) 210-41 (225-33).

least, crucially absent from Galen's Aristotelianism. And this absence has (to put it more positively) extremely significant and interesting consequences for the formulations which Galen produces.[60]

4. Let us take refuge, for a moment, in a rather less complex and exalted field of enquiry. In *Affections and errors* we seem to find another transformation – albeit a much smaller and probably less significant one – of a text of Aristotle, this time in the ethical context. Galen is listing some of the different candidates for 'the goal of life' advocated by different philosophical schools, without mentioning explicitly which school he has in mind. The summary in question is not presented as exhaustive, and is quite cursory; the context, in fact, is a sentence which raises the question whether *any* of the philosophers has found the right candidate. And the options mentioned are: pleasure; freedom from disturbance (*aochlêsia*); and virtue, or the activity in accordance with it. These last two appear to be paired grammatically, so that it would seem that Galen is attributing them both to one philosophical school. In any case, the last phrase, 'activity in accordance with virtue' seems Aristotelian; and, it seems that this is the school which Galen has in mind in using this phrase. Again, though, the specific phrase of Aristotle which is here being echoed is not being echoed quite accurately. For the passage underlying the Galenic formulation would seem to be that from the *Nicomachean Ethics* arguing that human good consists in the activity of the soul in accordance with virtue (*EN* 1.7, 1097b22-1098a20). Again, one could debate how significant the differences are between the line of Aristotle and Galen's summary of it. But it is the nature of Galen's interaction with the text which is of interest here. It is very probable that Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* is, *at some level*, in the background to Galen's ethical thought; indeed, there are works, in particular *Character traits*, in which this seems strongly to be the case. But again it is a work which (as far as I know) receives no verbatim citations in Galen's work, and for which – in stark contrast to his knowledge of the biological works – he seems to be relying either on a somewhat distant memory or on the discussions of Peripatetics.

5. I turn again, after that ethical interlude, to another level of greater difficulty and abstraction, namely that of physical theory. Here, both Galen's own theory and its relationship with its predecessors constitute questions of considerable complexity. This, too, is an area where Aristotle seems to be a central – if not the central – figure in the background to Galen's thought. The fact emerges, among other things, from a reading of *Elements according to Hippocrates* and, especially, *Mixtures*; and, it has been emphasized persuasively by Philip van der Eijk.[61]

[60] The question whether Alexander takes a similarly 'reductionist' step has been discussed in modern literature; see the useful summary by Kupreeva, 'Aristotelian dynamics' (n.43, above) 72, of this discussion in the recent literature; and *cf.* n.42, above. But Galen explicitly, in the course of his reference to Andronicus, rejects the supervenience theory which we find in Alexander and to that extent is (here at least) markedly more materialist or 'reductionist' in his Aristotelianism.

[61] In van der Eijk, '"Aristotle! What a thing for you to say!"' (n.38, above).

Galen's thought in this area seems to rely closely on Aristotle, and it seems to be informed by a detailed knowledge of Aristotelian biological and physical texts. The one most directly relevant in this context is *Generation and corruption* (although he does not quote from the work *in extenso*).

But again there seems to be something other than straightforward Aristotelianism going on here. There are two texts which are central to the understanding of Galen's element-theory at its most fundamental level: *Elements according to Hippocrates* and the *Commentary on Hippocrates' Nature of man*. Jim Hankinson has given a very good summary, both of the essentials of Galen's element theory and of the way in which it is related to Aristotle's, and I refer the reader to that discussion for the detail in relation to those texts.[62] In particular, Hankinson identifies a range of features in these texts which underline Galen's Aristotelianism, as well as his anti-Stoicism: the pairing of qualities in relation to elements (*e.g.* fire is hot *and* dry), as opposed to the one-to-one linking of qualities and elements; the notion that these are not equal pairings (one quality predominates); and, the association of air with moisture and water with coldness. There is also the preference (though it is not an absolutely decided one) for the theory that qualities alone are subject to total mixture over the Stoic view of interpenetration of substances ('total mixture').

So far, then, so Aristotelian. And, as Hankinson also points out, the distinction between *stoicheia* and *archai* is Aristotelian, too, even if Aristotle does not perhaps maintain it as strictly as Galen does. (Essentially, *stoicheia* are the fundamental things that actually occur, while *archai* are the fundamental things into which they are conceptually divisible.)

But there are at least a few passages that seem to go beyond anything that we find explicitly in Aristotle:

> And indeed that the first principles of the generation of fire are the matter which underlies (*hupobeblêmenê*) all the elements and is without qualities (*apoios*), and the extreme heat that enters into it, this too has been similarly agreed to.
>
> *Hipp.Elem.* 6, I.469-470 K = 114.16-18 De Lacy; trans. De Lacy

> For it is clear that they seek to expound what sort of thing the primary substance (*prôtê ousia*) is, which they say is ungenerated and eternal, and which underlies (*hupobeblêmenên*) all bodies which are subject to generation and destruction.
>
> *HNH* XV.3 K = 3.24-4.2 Mewaldt; trans. Hankinson

This seems to be another case where Galen apparently believes that he is being Aristotelian, but with (from our point of view) inadequate textual support. Galen's view of what happens at the *most* fundamental level of physical analysis is that matter, which at this level of analysis is devoid of any qualities, receives qualities (the hot, the dry, *etc.*) which make it into the sort of actual matter we encounter in the phenomenal world.

[62] R. J. Hankinson, 'Philosophy of nature' (n.59, above), esp. 214-17.

The terms *prôtê ousia* and *apoios* seem both to be used in reference to this unformed matter.[63] The former term is of particular interest in the context of the kind of transformation being performed on Aristotle, for it is surely not insignificant that *prôtê ousia*, which is an Aristotelian term, is here being used in a non-Aristotelian way. In the *Categories*, the phrase refers to what is most properly a subject of predication; here it refers to underlying matter.[64] This notion of a quality-less prime matter is, as Hankinson says, 'dubiously Aristotelian'.[65]

We have here, it seems to me, a further example of Galen's simultaneous indebtedness to, and departure from, authentic Aristotle. And again, the precise nature of his engagement with a specific text – here *Generation and corruption* – is difficult to determine (though in this case it would be difficult to argue that he did not know the text well). And this turns out to be another example, too, of Galen's particular take on the Aristotelian form-matter distinction. The reception of qualities by quality-less nature is an example of matter being informed (*cf.* what is said about this also in *The capacities of the soul*, in a passage immediately following that quoted earlier: 'it is Aristotle's own belief that the natural body comes about through the four qualities arising in the matter');[66] but this particular relationship of form and matter is not quite identical to anything we get clearly in Aristotle.

It should be mentioned here that connections may be made between this particular departure from Aristotle and both Stoic thought, on the one hand, and Alexander of Aphrodisias, on the other. In relation to the former, we should point out that Galen quite frequently adopts Stoic 'technical' terms in a decontextualized way which does not imply that he is adopting the intellectual framework to which they originally belong.[67] As regards Alexander, there may indeed be similarities; as already stated, I will not here engage in the complexities of this relationship, on which there is already a large literature. But – at the risk of a simplification of those complexities – I will at least remark that the chief discussion of mixture by Alexander seems to me remarkably distinct from Galen's, both in its wish to address head-on a question (the truth or falsity of the 'total mixture' doctrine) about which, as we have seen, Galen is fairly relaxed, and in the particular language used in relation to matter and form.[68]

[63] *Cf.* also *HNH* XV.31 K = 18.13-15 Mewaldt: ἐκεῖνο τὸ ὑποκείμενον ἅπασι κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ φύσιν ἄποιον ὑπάρχον.

[64] *Cat.* 5, 2a11-3b11. I am again indebted to Jim Hankinson for this observation (and reference). *Cf.* R. J. Hankinson, 'Commentary on Hippocrates' *Nature of man*', trans. with introduction and notes, in *Galen: works on human nature*, ed. P. J. van der Eijk and P. N. Singer (Cambridge, forthcoming), note *ad loc.*

[65] Hankinson, 'Philosophy of nature' (n.59, above) 237 n.17.

[66] *QAM* 3, IV.774 K = 37.17-19 Müller.

[67] Here, *apoios*; examples from elsewhere in his work would be the terms *hormê* and the language of assent (*sunkatathesis*), both used in discussions of voluntary motion and decision-making.

[68] The closest parallel, as far as I can find, to Galen's usage in this area in Alexander's *De mixtione* is not extremely close: τὴν σύμπασαν οὐσίαν ... πᾶσαν τὴν ἔνυλόν τε καὶ μεταβλητὴν οὐσίαν, 223.6-12; *cf.* R. B. Todd, *Alexander of Aphrodisias on Stoic physics: a study of the 'De mixtione'*

6. It is worth at least mentioning a couple of other examples of 'Aristotelian transformation' which have already been identified in the scholarly literature, though I have nothing to add to the analyses that have been made of them. In each of these cases, too, it seems possible to interpret the transformation as stemming from Galen's originality, from his slightly distanced engagement with relevant texts, or from discussions within contemporary Aristotelianism – or indeed from some interaction of these factors.

The first is Galen's detailed analysis of different types of cause. The situation here is summarized by Hankinson;[69] again we find a distinctively Galenic version of 'Aristotle's causes'.

The second is the particular version of an 'Aristotelian' hierarchy of types of argument that appears in *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*. In this case the peculiarity of Galen's version, and its slightly complex and unclear links to specific texts of Aristotle (and the scholarly tradition), have been well analyzed by Tieleman.[70]

with preliminary essays, text, translation and commentary (Leiden 1976) 132-33, with his notes *ad loc.* The focus of Alexander's argument is of course somewhat different from Galen's. *Cf.* Kupreeva, 'Aristotelian dynamics' (n.43, above), and n.42 above.

[69] Hankinson, 'Philosophy of nature' (n.59, above) 225-33, with reference also to his fuller discussion of such questions elsewhere.

[70] Tieleman, *Galen and Chrysippus on the soul* (n.55, above) esp. 17-23. In this context I should say a little about Tieleman's thesis in relation to the influence of doxographical summaries of other authors, and of the scholastic tradition more generally, on Galen. This may seem to present a relevant, or even alternative, account to the present one, in terms of the nature of Galen's interaction with the contemporary philosophical tradition. I would summarize by saying that, to the extent that Tieleman is attempting to locate Galen within a philosophical culture, and point out that '[i]t is highly improbable that he studied these difficult treatises without being aided and affected by the interpretations and commentary literature available in his day' (*ibid.*, xvi-xvii, the specific context there being Galen's reading of the Aristotelian *Organon* and of Theophrastus), I am entirely in agreement with him; but, his specific assertion of the central importance of the 'Placita tradition' seems to me rather more tenuous and speculative. Doxographical handbooks, to my mind, risk offering an explanation of Galen's thought which is at once insufficient, on the one hand, and too specific on the other. Galen's knowledge of or indebtedness to a philosophical text seems at times too great, and at other times too individualistic, for doxographical summaries to be seen as seriously significant. It seems to me preferable to talk of interaction with the contemporary tradition of Aristotelianism (or Platonism, *etc.*) and with the philosophical and educational culture of Galen's time – a culture which, to be sure, would have included handbooks alongside other tools of instruction and dissemination, most notably in lectures, commentaries, public debates. It is impossible for me here to engage in detail with the range of examples and connections which Tieleman adduces – many of them extremely useful and interesting. In some cases, however, I would say that the specific cases cited by Tieleman of the importance of the 'Placita tradition' seem to me somewhat unconvincing: to take a couple of examples, whether Galen needed such a tradition 'to identify Plato and Hippocrates as encephalocentrists' must be doubtful (*cf. ibid.* xxxiv); and, Galen's organization of the subject matter regarding the soul, for example, seems to me not nearly as close to 'Aëtius' as Tieleman suggests (*ibid.* 8).

7. Our discussion has focussed almost entirely on a certain kind of response to, or reporting of, Aristotle and Aristotelianism on Galen's part. Let us end with a few examples of what appears, at least, to be a similar phenomenon in relation to Plato and Platonism.

The first is represented by a single word: *prôtogona*. This, Galen tells us, is the Platonic term equivalent to the Arisotelian *homoiomerê*: uniform parts of a body (*e.g.* blood or bone). Galen asserts the equivalence more than once.[71] Yet the adjective *prôtogonos* is not found in the text of Plato as we have it. The closest parallel is the adjective *prôtogenês*, which is found in the *Politicus* (288e and 289b); and the context there would not support an equivalence with *homoiomerês*. Is Galen here relying on a distant memory of a text of Plato – or rather on some other text or discussion among Platonists of his time, unknown to us?

Our next example is equally simple. At *Foet.Form.* 6, IV.700-01 K = 104.25-26 Nickel, Galen attributes to an unnamed 'Platonist teacher of mine' the view that the 'soul extended throughout the whole cosmos' is the entity responsible for the formation or 'shaping' (*diaplasis*) of embryos. There seems little reason to doubt the report; but, as noted by Nickel *ad loc.*, the view cannot be related to any identifiable Platonist of Galen's time. In this case, then, Galen is reporting a Platonist discussion which we do not have in an extant text.

Our final example similarly involves certain possibly Platonist discussions or usages relevant to the soul, which Galen reports, but for which we do not have clear evidence elsewhere. The material here, however, is somewhat more complex. We begin again with *The capacities of the soul*. In the second chapter of that work, Galen criticizes a misunderstanding of the nature of 'capacity' (*dunamis*) in the following terms:

> [M]any of the philosophers … seem to me to imagine capacities as if they were some object inhabiting the substances, in the same way that we inhabit our houses. *QAM* 2 IV.769 K = 33.17-20 Müller

The capacity, Galen is arguing, is not something separate or separable from the thing that has that capacity. The rather striking terminology of 'inhabiting houses' finds a parallel – albeit in the different context of soul and body – in *The affected places*:

> But if this part of the soul is in the body that contains it in the same way as we are in a house, we would perhaps not imagine that the *archê* itself was damaged at all by virtue of the place [that contains it] … While the philosophers differ on this point, some saying that it is contained as in a dwelling, and some as a form (*eidos*), it is difficult to find out *how* it is damaged; *that* it is damaged, though, can be learned by experience. *Loc.Aff.* 2.10, VIII.127-28 K

Who, one wonders, are these philosophers who state, either that capacities inhabit substances as we inhabit houses, or that the soul is contained as in a dwelling? For the usage of 'house' or 'dwelling' in the latter context it seems to me to be difficult to find a direct parallel elsewhere. Perhaps, however, a rather indirect Platonic connection can be made.

[71] *QAM* 3, IV.773 K = 37.4-5 Müller; *HNH* XV.8 K = 6.19-20 Mewaldt.

In Book VII of *The doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, Galen – in a way which reminds us of the argument of *The capacities of the soul* – addresses the question whether the soul is incorporeal or is in fact a body. In the process he uses a number of verbal formulations similar to those just cited. If the soul is incorporeal, the *pneuma* in the brain must be its 'first dwelling' (*prôton oikêtêrion*) (*PHP* 7.3, V.606 K = 442.37-444.1 De Lacy). The soul 'dwells (*oikein*) in the actual body of the brain' (*PHP* 7.3, V.606 K = 444.5-6 De Lacy). The psychic *pneuma* is so called not because it is the substance of the soul, but because it 'dwells (*oikousês*) in the brain as the soul's first instrument (*prôton organon*)' (*PHP* 7.3, V.608 K = 444.30-32 De Lacy). The *pneuma* is 'not the substance of the soul, nor its house (*oikos*), but its first instrument' (*PHP* 7.3, V.609 K = 446.12-13 De Lacy).

But, somewhat later on in Book VII, there is an interesting variation in language. Again there are two possibilities, this time, either that the soul's substance is a bright and ethereal body (a view to which he considers both the Stoics and Aristotle logically committed!) or it is 'itself an incorporeal substance, but has this body as its first vehicle (*okhêma*)' (*PHP* 7.7, V.643 K = 474.22-26 De Lacy).

Now, with this talk of *okhêma* we are very clearly in the realms of a Platonist discourse. This is indeed the term, ultimately traceable to Plato's *Phaedo*, *Phaedrus* and *Timaeus*, that was later to take on such prominence in discussions of the embodied and disembodied soul by Neoplatonists[72] – but which had no such prominence in the extant Platonist texts of Galen's own time. In view of the similarity of argumentative context of the *okhêma* in this passage and of the various terms for 'dwelling' in those quoted above, it seems clear that Galen in some way associates the two concepts.

It may be that here, too, we are encountering Galenic vagueness in his report of a text or discussion – or that 'dwelling' is a term which he takes to be more or less equivalent to the terms actually used by (Platonist) philosophers. But it is tempting to think (and supported by Galen's reference to 'many' or 'some' philosophers in relation to this usage) that Galen is giving us a glimpse here of the terms in which certain groups at his own time – perhaps the forerunners of the Neoplatonists with whom we are familiar – actually discussed the matter.[73]

We may, finally, consider one more pre-echo of what was certainly to become a debate within Platonism and may – though more speculatively – be seen as a specifically

[72] For an overview of the concept and its history, see R. Sorabji, *The philosophy of the commentators 200-600 AD: a sourcebook*, 3 vols (London 2004) I: *Psychology* 221-41. Some of those Neoplatonists, of course, can be clearly seen as the intellectual descendants of Galen's body-denying, 'self-styled Platonists' of *The capacities of the soul*.

[73] A further possible parallel for the phraseology which Galen reports is suggested to me by Peter Adamson. Plotinus, *Enn.* 4.3.4, uses the analogy of light, which is divided up amongst different houses on earth, but still remains one, for the soul's relationship with the body (and for this analogy Armstrong *ad loc.* compares Marcus Aurelius, *Med.* 12.30). The fundamental point of Plotinus's example – the oneness of the soul – is certainly different; but both the (neo-)Platonist connection here and the slight distance of the relationship with Galen are at least consistent with my argument here. That is to say, both Plotinus and Galen may, at their different removes, be reflecting some usage relating the concepts of souls and dwellings which was current in Galen's time.

Platonist usage. Porphyry, at *de Abstinentia* 3.2.1, makes a distinction between προφορικός ('outward') and ἐνδιάθετος (internal) λόγος, in the context of the discussion of the sense in which animals can be said to have reason. Both this question, and this precise terminology, are directly paralleled by Galen in his *Exhortation.*[74] It is true that this, or similar, usage also occurs elsewhere;[75] and also true that it has been regarded as a specifically Stoic distinction (and has been canonized as such by its inclusion in *SVF*). But we should be aware that the Stoic heritage of the terminology is only attested by Porphyry, while both Galen and Sextus Empiricus attribute it respectively to 'the philosophers' and 'the dogmatics'.[76] Quite what Galen is doing with the distinction in the two passages in question, and indeed the broader question of Galen's view of the rationality of animals, are much bigger questions; but, there seems, here too, to be at least some relation between the debate in his mind and that attested in the Platonic tradition about a century later.

Conclusion

It is, to be sure, a frustrating enterprise to try to discern Galen's engagement with the unknown Aristotelian, or Platonist, shades of his time. It seems to me, however, that the attempt has not been without interest; we seem, at least, to glimpse some traces of a live debate, before the period for which (from Alexander onwards) such debate was transformed into a substantial body of surviving texts.

As I have suggested, it is not possible to determine with any certainty where the effects of such engagement end and where Galen's originality, or even eccentricity, takes over. If the Aristotelian transformations outlined above arose largely *without* reference to contemporary debates, that, of course, would be no less interesting.

I hope, in fact, that the above has shown the originality and (from our point of view, at least) uniqueness of Galen's engagement with the Aristotelian tradition – an originality and uniqueness which of course contributed to a model of the human body and soul which were of immense influence over a period of centuries. At the same time we have, perhaps, cast some light, however dim, on the murky picture of the living Platonic and Aristotelian traditions in Rome in the second century AD.

[74] *Protr.* 1, I.1 K = 84.5-6 Boudon (and *cf. Hipp.Off.Med.* 1.3, XVIIIB.650 K., which again mentions the term ἐνδιάθετος).

[75] For parallels *cf.* Boudon *ad loc.* on the *Protr.* passage (119, where, however, the passage cited from Aristotle, *APo.* 76b24-27, is similar in sense but not in precise linguistic terms); and Sodano ad *loc.* on the passage from Porphyry (*Porfirio: Astinenza dagli animali*, ed., with intro. by G. Girgenti, trans. into Italian, with notes by A. R. Sodano (Milan 2005) 445-56, citing among others Plutarch).

[76] Galen in the passage from *Hipp.Off.Med.* already cited (n.74); Sextus Empiricus at *M.* 8.275. These, indeed, are the passages that provide 'Stoic' testimony, appearing as *SVF* 2.135 and 223.